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| 股东失权制度下后端减资体系新解 |
| A New Interpretation of the Back-End Capital Reduction System Under the Shareholder Disqualification Mechanism |
| 投稿时间：2025-04-22 |
| DOI：10.16018/j.cnki.cn32-1499/c.202506005 |
| 中文关键词: 股东失权制度 架空 德国声明股权丧失程序 减资程序 |
| 英文关键词: shareholder disqualification mechanism circumvention Germany's declaratory share forfeiture procedure capital reduction procedure |
| 基金项目: |
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| 摘要点击次数: 11 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 我国公司法增设股东失权制度，系沿袭德国声明股权丧失程序之结果。然二者又在后端构造上有显著的区别，我国特别规定转让或者减资注销期限为六个月，结合新公司法关于违法减资恢复原状的规定，极易产生股东失权制度被架空的风险。从探究并借鉴德国声明股权丧失程序的功能定位及价值追求着手，从体系解释及目的解释的角度出发，解释股东失权制度下减资程序的法律适用，以期实现股东失权制度的自身价值。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The introduction of the shareholder disqualification mechanism into China's Company Law draws upon Germany's declaratory share forfeiture procedure. However, significant differences exist in their back-end structures. China's special provision establish a six-month period for share transfer or capital reduction and cancellation, when combined with the new Company Law provisions regarding restitution for default-related capital reduction, creates substantial risks of circumventing the shareholder disqualification system. This paper seeks to interpret the legal application of capital reduction procedures under the shareholder disqualification framework through systematic interpretation and teleological interpretation, drawing upon the functional and value orientation of Germany's declaratory share forfeiture procedure. The ultimate objective is to realize the inherent institutional value of China's shareholder disqualification system. |
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