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| 政府补贴下考虑利他偏好的绿色供应链决策研究 |
| Research on the Green Supply Chain Considering Reciprocal Preferences and Government Subsidies |
| 投稿时间：2023-06-12 |
| DOI：10.16018/j.cnki.cn32-1499/c.202304007 |
| 中文关键词: 三阶段 绿色供应链 政府补贴 利他偏好 决策 |
| 英文关键词: three-stage green supply chain government subsidy reciprocal preference strategy |
| 基金项目:国家社科基金青年项目(21CJY029)；江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2018SJA1539)。 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 通过构建由政府、制造商和零售商组成的三阶段绿色供应链，探讨绿色供应链中政企博弈问题，分别建立供应链成员的双方利他偏好、仅制造商具有利他偏好、仅零售商具有利他偏好，双方都不具有利他偏好4种Stackelberg博弈模型，研究成员的利他偏好和政府的补贴同时对绿色供应链的定价、产品绿色度、供应链各方的利润和整体利润的影响。研究结果表明:政府补贴和利他偏好行为对供应链的最优决策产生较显著的影响。政府补贴系数对供应链决策成员的行为偏好具有负向效应。相较于制造商的利他偏好行为和双方成员都具有利他偏好行为的模型，零售商的利他偏好行为对供应链会产生不利的影响，而政府的补贴行为能够减弱其消极作用。制造商的利他偏好行为更易于合作，有助于提高供应链的整体期望效用和社会福利效用。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Based on three-stage game model composed of the government, a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper studies the problem of government subsidies and enterprises′ cooperative behavior. Four Stackelberg game models are established to analyze the effects of the government subsidies and the supply chain members′ reciprocal preferences on the pricing, production green degree, the supply chain members′ profit and the whole supply chain profit. Results show that both government subsidies and the supply chain members′ reciprocal preferences can significantly affect the optimal decision of supply chain. The government subsidy coefficient has a negative effect on the supply chain members′ reciprocal preferences. Compared with the manufacturer′s reciprocal preference and both members with reciprocal preferences, the retailer′s reciprocal preference can adversely affect the supply chain, while the government subsidies can reduce its negative effects. The manufacturer′s reciprocal preference is easier to cooperate and help to improve the whole utility of the supply chain and the social welfare. |
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